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PIERCING THE VEIL OF A TEXAS LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANY: How LIMITED
IS MEMBER LIABILITY?
Natalie Smeltzer*
I. INTRODUCTIONJ N the world of business entities, the limited liability company
("LLC") is emerging as a popular choice, combining the attractive
tax advantages of a partnership with the limited liability protection of
a corporation for all of its members. Texas enacted the Texas Limited
Liability Company Act ("TLLCA") in 1991.1 The TLLCA provides that
"a member or manager is not liable for the debts, obligations or liabilities
of a limited liability company."' 2 Further, the statute says that "[a] mem-
ber of an [LLC] is not a proper party to proceedings by or against a[n]
[LLC], except where the object is to enforce a member's right against or
liability to the [LLC]. ' ' 3
The theory of piercing the corporate veil ("PCV") is well-developed by
both the courts and statutes in Texas. Article 2.21 of the Texas Business
Corporation Act ("TBCA") specifically addresses corporate veil pierc-
ing.4 However, the concept of piercing the veil in other forms of Texas
business entities, such as the LLC, is not as well developed. The TLLCA
does not speak to whether or under what circumstances one may pierce
the LLC veil, as does the TBCA in Article 2.21.
Although the TLLCA does not address veil piercing, courts in Texas
have been presented with the issue of piercing the veil of the LLC and
* J.D. Candidate 2009, SMU Dedman School of Law; B.B.A. in Accounting, summa
cum laude, Harding University; Certified Public Accountant, State of Texas. This article
was written as of February 2008. 1 would like to thank my family for their love and sup-
port. I would also like to give a special thanks to Katrina Smeltzer and Kayla Haynie for
their writing guidance over the years.
1. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n (Vernon Supp. 2008); TEX. Bus. ORGS.
CODE ANN., tit. 3, § 101 (Vernon Supp. 2008). Effective January 1, 2006, all LLCs formed
in Texas will be governed by the Texas Business Organizations Code ("TBOC") Chapter
101. Unless electing otherwise, existing LLCs will governed by the TLLCA until January
1, 2010, when all LLCs in Texas will be subject to the TBOC. Throughout this paper,
references will be made to the TLLCA. Unless otherwise noted, the portions of the
TLLCA cited to are substantially the same as those under TBOC Chapter 101.
2. Art. 1528n, § 4.03A; see also TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.114 (Vernon
Supp. 2008).
3. Art. 1528n, § 4.03C; see also TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.113 (Vernon
Supp. 2008).
4. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.21 (Vernon 2003).
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holding a member or members personally liable for an LLC's liability. In
response, some Texas courts have applied corporate veil piercing princi-
ples to the LLC.5 The uncertainty and novelty in application of the the-
ory to the LLC in Texas presents several issues. First, should the LLC be
treated differently than the corporation in regards to veil piercing? Addi-
tionally, should Texas courts look to how other jurisdictions have handled
the LLC piercing issue? Finally, is one better off using the corporate
form rather than the LLC in regards to susceptibility to veil piercing?
Because the TLLCA includes no provisions addressing veil piercing,
one may be subject to pre-Article 2.21 laws in Texas when using the LLC
form. However, a corporation has the protection of Article 2.21 in veil-
piercing cases. In conclusion, one may be better off using the corporate
form over the LLC when considering potential liability of a member with
respect to an LLC. Section I sets forth a background of the LLC entity
and the Texas corporate veil piercing doctrine. First, it provides a brief
summary of the LLC business form and the unique and attractive attrib-
utes that it provides. Next, it discusses the evolution of Texas statutory
and common law in regards to piercing the corporate veil. Section II
presents a discussion of the state of the statutory and common law of veil
piercing in regards to the LLC. It begins with a discussion of statutory
law in various jurisdictions, and then the common law in Texas and other
jurisdictions are presented through an examination of several cases ad-
dressing LLC veil piercing. Finally, this comment concludes with an anal-
ysis of Texas LLC veil piercing. The analysis first addresses how the law
in Texas should develop in regards to piercing the LLC veil, and then it
considers whether the LLC or the corporate form offers greater protec-
tion against veil piercing.
A. BUSINEss FORM CHOICE: THE LLC
A brief outline of the LLC as a business form is a useful starting point.
In 1977, Wyoming was the first state to enact an LLC statute. By 1995, all
states had enacted LLC statutes;6 although there are some material dif-
ferences and many technical variations among the statutes, there is a
trend toward uniformity. 7 The general nature of the LLC can be de-
scribed in four characteristics: "(i) limited liability; (ii) partnership tax
features; (iii) chameleon management-that is, the ability to choose be-
tween centralized and direct member-management; and (iv) creditor-pro-
tection provisions."'8
5. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Wani Venture, A.S., 251 S.W.3d 573 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).
6. For a further discussion on the innovation of the LLC and initial efforts to develop
state legislation, see ROBERT W. HAMILTON & JONATHON R. MACEY, CASES AND MATER-
IALS ON CORPORATIONS, INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES
163 (Jesse H. Choper et al. eds., 9th ed. 2005).
7. Id.
8. HAMILTON & MACEY. supra note 6, at 166 (quoting Larry E. Ribstein, The Emer-
gence of the Limited Liability Company, 51 Bus. LAW. 1, 2-3, 6-10 (1995)).
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A key purpose of choosing this business form is to capitalize on the
investor protection of limited liability and the partnership tax status that
avoids double taxation.9 In contrast to a limited partnership, no one is
personally liable by default, like a general partner, for the liabilities of the
LLC.' 0 Certain entities, including Texas LLCs, can choose to be taxed as
partnerships under the "Check the Box" regulations if they have more
than one member." Further, if it is a single member LLC, it can choose
to be taxed as an individual while still maintaining the advantage of lim-
ited liability.12
The owners of an LLC are referred to as "members," and there are no
restrictions on the number or type of members an LLC may have.13 Sin-
gle member LLCs are permissible; however, as previously noted, they will
not qualify for partnership tax treatment. 14 The Texas statute is consis-
tent in that there are generally no restrictions on who can be a member.' 5
Under the new TBOC, every member and manager has equal voting
rights, unless the company agreement states differently. 16
Flexibility of management structure is a significant advantage to the
LLC business form. An LLC can choose to be managed by its members,
managers, or both.17 This is an advantage over a limited partnership, in
which limited partners cannot participate in management without jeop-
ardizing their liability shield.' 8 Further, because there is not a general
partner with personal liability to manage, members may wish to man-
age.' 9 As the TBOC provides, management can be structured within
these parameters, as desired, under the company agreement. 20 Another
example of the flexibility of management is seen in the powers of man-
agement. 2' The TBOC designates all officers and managers of an LLC as
agents with the authority to act on behalf of the company if the action is
for the company's business purpose.2 2 These powers are much broader
and more flexible than those of a corporate director, who must normally
act in agreement with the majority vote. 23 Therefore, the LLC is more
akin to a partnership, in which partners usually have unilateral power to
bind the partnership. 24
9. Id. at 165. As a result of the new "check the box" tax rules enacted in 1997, LLCs
can decide whether to be taxed as a corporation or a partnership. Id.
10. Robert M. Mendell, Texas Limited Liability Companies, June 28, 2007, at 4, availa-
ble at http://www.mendellgroup.com/Limited-Liability-Companies.pdf.
11. Id. at 2-3, 9
12. Id.
13. Id. at 3.
14. Id.
15. See TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.113 (Vernon Supp. 2008).
16. Mendell, supra note 10, at 4.
17. TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.251 (Vernon Supp. 2008).
18. Mendell, supra note 10, at 4.
19. Id.
20. TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.252 (Vernon Supp. 2008).
21. See id. § 101.254.
22. Id.
23. Mendell, supra note 10, at 5.
24. Id.
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Finally, limited liability is a paramount advantage of the LLC. This is
one of the key advantages over a limited partnership, where only the lim-
ited partners-if they do not lose their liability shield by participating in
management-have limited liability. The Texas statute provides that, un-
less the company agreement states otherwise, "a member or manager is
not liable for a debt, obligation, or liability of a limited liability company,
including ... under a judgment, decree, or order of a court."25 In addi-
tion, the statute says that "a member of a[n LLC] is not a proper party to
proceedings by or against a[n LLC], except where the object is to enforce
a member's right against or liability to the [LLC]. ' '26
B. DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE VEIL PIERCING THEORY IN TEXAS
A brief survey of the development, over the past several decades, of
the PCV legal theory is a logical place to begin. The alter ego theory is
one of the most traditional bases for disregarding the corporate entity.
This theory applies "when there is such unity between corporation and
individual that the separateness of the corporation has ceased and hold-
ing only the corporation liable would result in injustice."' 27 It is estab-
lished "from the total dealings of the corporation and the individual,
including the degree to which ... corporate and individual property have
been kept separately, the amount of financial interest, ownership and
control the individual maintains over the corporation, and whether the
corporation has been used for personal purposes. 28 Thus, the total deal-
ings between the corporation and shareholder are pertinent in establish-
ing alter ego.29
In 1986, the Texas Supreme Court took an extraordinary turn in the
veil piercing doctrine in Castleberry v. Branscum by rewriting the doc-
trine in an unjustifiably broad manner. 30 The court noted that the alter
ego theory was only one way to pierce the corporate veil.31 In addition,
the court recognized that "a sham to perpetrate fraud" was another, sepa-
rate basis for piercing the veil. 32 Further, either actual or constructive
fraud would be sufficient.33 The court distinguished the two types of
fraud: "[a]ctual fraud usually involves dishonesty of purpose or intent to
deceive, whereas constructive fraud is the breach of some legal or equita-
ble duty which, irrespective of moral guilt, the law declares fraudulent
25. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, § 4.03A (Vernon Supp. 2008); see also TEX.
Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.114 (Vernon Supp. 2008).
26. Art. 1528n, § 4.03C; see also TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.113 (Vernon
Supp. 2008).
27. First Nat'l Bank v. Gamble, 132 S.W.2d 100, 103 (Tex. 1939).
28. Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. 1986); Hall v. Timmons, 987
S.W.2d 248, 250 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1999, no pet.).
29. Castleberry, 721 S.W.2d at 272.
30. Elisabeth S. Miller, Owner Liability Protection and Piercing the Veil of Texas Busi-
ness Organizations, at 1, May 27, 2005, available at http://Iaw.Baylor.edu/faculty/faculty-
publications.htm.
31. Castleberry, 721 S.W.2d at 272.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 273.
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because of its tendency to deceive others, to violate confidence, or to in-jure public interest."' 34 Finally, the court disregarded the distinction be-
tween tort and contract claims.35 In summary, under the broad rewriting
of the PCV theory, it appeared that shareholders' shield from liability for
both tort and contract claims was left to the jury's application of a vague
and intangible standard. 36
The reaction to the Castleberry opinion was so overwhelming that the
Texas legislature responded by amending the TBCA.37 Notably, this was
the first attempt by any state legislature to codify the PCV theory.38 The
amended statute makes it quite difficult to pierce the corporate veil on a
contract claim by requiring a showing of actual fraud.39 Article 2.21A(2)
states:
A holder of shares, an owner of any beneficial interest in shares, or a
subscriber for shares .... or any affiliate thereof or of the corpora-
tion, shall be under no obligation to the corporation or its obligees
with respect to: . . . any contractual obligation of the corporation or
any matter relating to or arising from the obligation on the basis that
the holder . . . is or was the alter ego of the corporation, or on the
basis of actual fraud or constructive fraud, a sham to perpetrate a
fraud, or other similar theory, unless the obligee demonstrates that
the holder ... caused the corporation to be used for the purpose of
perpetrating and did perpetrate an actual fraud on the obligee pri-
marily for the direct personal benefit of the holder .... 40
In contrast, Article 2.21 does not necessitate a showing of actual fraud if
the claim is not based on a contract of the corporation, but rather on a
tort or statutory liability.41 Although actual fraud is not necessary when
the underlying claim is not contractual, Texas courts have nevertheless
required that the claim be founded on notions of "justice and fairness. '42
While the failure to follow corporate formalities was originally a factor
in veil piercing, the Texas legislature also addressed this in Article
2.21A(3), 43 which states: "[a] holder of shares.., shall be under no obli-
gation to the corporation or to its obligees with respect to: ... any obliga-
tion of the corporation on the basis of the failure of the corporation to
observe any corporate formality .... ,,44 In accordance with 2.21(A)(3),
Texas courts do not consider failure to follow corporate formalities a fac-
34. Id. (citing Archer v. Griffith, 390 S.W.2d 735, 740 (Tex. 1964)).
35. Id.
36. HAMILTON & MACEY, supra note 6, at 279.
37. Id.; see also TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.21 (Vernon 2003).
38. HAMILTON & MACEY, supra note 6, at 279.
39. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.21A(2) (Vernon 2003).
40. Id.
41. Miller, supra note 30, at 2; see Love v. State, 972 S.W.2d 114, 117-18 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1998, writ denied).
42. Miller, supra note 30, at 2.
43. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.21A(3) (Vernon 2003).
44. Id. TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.223(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 2008).
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tor in piercing the corporate veil. 45 Further, the suggested jury instruc-
tion in the Texas Pattern Jury Charges for the alter ago theory noticeably
excludes language regarding lack of corporate formalities.
46
Finally, the "single business enterprise theory" has developed in Texas
case law over the past few decades.47 While the Texas Supreme Court
has not approved or disapproved the theory, numerous lower courts in
Texas have applied it.4 8 The courts have explained this theory by the
concept that corporations, affiliates, or both "integrate their resources to
achieve a common business purpose."' 49 Additionally, courts have used
lists of factors to determine whether corporations were kept as separate
entities. 50 More recent decisions have confirmed that the single business
enterprise theory appears to be a viable theory in Texas although still not
spoken to by the Texas Supreme Court. Further, courts have concluded
that the theory falls under 2.21A(2), therefore requiring proof of actual
fraud.51 These cases prove, as in the alter ego cases, that the actual fraud
standard is a tough hurdle to overcome in piercing the veil.
52
II. PIERCING THE VEIL OF AN LLC:
THE STATE OF THE LAW
A. STATUTORY LAW IN TEXAS AND OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Although all fifty states have enacted LLC statutes, only a handful of
them expressly speak to the issue of veil piercing.53 The Colorado statute
45. See, e.g., Carone v. Retamco Operating Inc., 138 S.W.3d 1, 113 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 2004, pet. denied); Hall v. Timmons, 987 S.W.2d 248, 250 n.2 (Tex. App.-Beau-
mont 1999, no pet.); Miller, supra note 30, at 3.
46. See PATTERN JURY CHARGES 108.2; Miller, supra note 30, at 3.
47. See Miller, supra note 30, at 3-4 for an excellent discussion of the rise of the "single
business enterprise theory" in Texas.
48. See S. Union Co. v. City of Edinburg, 129 S.W.3d 74, 87 (Tex. 2003) ("We need not
decide today whether a theory of 'single business enterprise' is a necessary addition to...
the theory of alter ego for disregarding corporate structure and the theories of joint ven-
ture, joint enterprise, or partnership for imposing joint and several liability."); Nat'l Plan
Adm'rs, Inc. v. Nat'l Health Ins. Co., 235 S.W.3d 695, 704 (Tex. 2007) ("We do not reach
the question of, and express no opinion on, whether the single-business enterprise theory is
a viable doctrine to pierce the corporate veil ....").
49. Paramount Petroleum Corp. v. Taylor Rental Ctr., 712 S.W.2d 534, 536 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
50. Id. ("Factors to be considered ... include but are not limited to the following:
common employees; common offices; centralized accounting; payment of wages by one
corporation to another corporation's employees; common business name; services ren-
dered by the employees of one corporation on behalf of another corporation; undocu-
mented transfers of funds between corporations; and unclear allocation of profits and
losses between corporations.").
51. See Miller, supra note 30, at 3-4 (discussing recent Texas cases); see S. Union Co.,
129 S.W.3d at 74; Olympic Fin. Ltd. v. Consumer Credit Corp., 9 F. Supp. 2d 726 (S.D. Tex.
1998); Nordar Holdings, Inc. v. W. Sec. (USA) Ltd., 969 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
52. Miller, supra note 30, at 3-4 (noting that under the actual fraud standard of con-
tracts cases, it is much harder to pierce the veil than in the context of tort cases where there
is not an actual fraud requirement under Article 2.21).
53. For an analysis of various LLC statutes and the issue of veil piercing, see Karin
Schwindt, Comment, Limited Liability Companies: Issues in Member Liability, 44 UCLA
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is an example of a statute which expressly speaks to veil piercing.54 It
states:
In any case in which a party seeks to hold the members of a limited
liability company personally responsible for the alleged improper ac-
tions of the limited liability company, the court shall apply the case
law which interprets the conditions and circumstances under which
the corporate veil of a corporation may be pierced under Colorado
law.55
The language of the Colorado statute clearly recognizes the theory in re-
gards to LLCs and directs the courts to apply corporate case law.56 Addi-
tionally, it says failure "to observe the formalities or requirements
relating to the management of its business and affairs is not in itself a
ground for imposing personal liability on the members for liabilities of
the limited liability company. ' 57 This language is similar to the Texas
statutory provisions for corporations. 58
The California statute arguably offers the most precise assistance in
applying the corporate veil piercing theory to an LLC.59 It provides that:
A member of a[n LLC] shall be subject to liability under the com-
mon law governing alter ego liability, and shall also be personally
liable . . . for any debt, obligation, or liability of the [LLC],
whether ... aris[ing] in contract, tort, or otherwise, under the same
or similar circumstances and to the same extent as a shareholder of a
corporation ... except that the failure to hold meetings of members
or managers or ... observe formalities pertaining to the calling or
conduct of meetings shall not be considered a factor tending to es-
tablish . . . alter ego or personal liability ... where the articles of
organization ... do not expressly require the holding of meetings of
members or managers.60
The language recognizes there are differences in organization and formal-
ities between a corporation and an LLC, and thus precludes informalities
from being a factor in LLC cases despite being a factor in many corporate
cases.
Some statutes simply refer LLC veil piercing cases to corporate veil
piercing law61 with language tending to "equate[ ] the liability shield of
L. REV. 1541, 1553 (1997) (categorizing the statutes into three categories: those whose
language either explicitly, implicitly, or do not at all address the issue of veil piercing).
54. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-107(1) (West 2006). Minnesota, Maine, North Da-
kota, Tennessee, Washington, and Wisconsin also contain express provisions.
55. Id.
56. Schwindt, supra note 53, at 1553.
57. § 7-80-107(2).
58. See TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.21A(3) (Vernon 2003).
59. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 17101(b) (West 2006).
60. Id.
61. See e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-314 (1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 645(3)
(2004); MINN. STAT. § 322B.303(2) (1993); WASH. REV. CODE § 25.15.060 (1990).
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members to the liability shield enjoyed by shareholders. ' 62 Minnesota's
statute is an example, providing that "[t]he case law that states the condi-
tions and circumstances under which the corporate veil of a corporation
may be pierced under Minnesota law also applies to limited liability com-
panies."'63 Therefore, one reading a statute similar to Minnesota's would
infer that an LLC member is susceptible to veil piercing because a corpo-
rate shareholder is susceptible. 64
Finally, a significant number of states, including Texas, do not speak at
all to veil piercing in their LLC statutes.65 Does the absence of statutory
language in these states mean the legislature did not intend for the theory
to apply to the LLC, or rather that the legislature wanted to leave the
theory open to the courts to develop the common law? In Texas, it ap-
pears the judiciary believes the legislature has left the doctrine to be de-
veloped by the common law.
B. COMMON LAW IN TEXAS AND OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Texas state appellate courts and bankruptcy courts have spoken on the
veil piercing issue in the context of the LLC. To date, the Texas Supreme
Court has not yet directly addressed veil piercing in the LLC context.
Recently, the court had the opportunity to do so in McCarthy v. Wani
Venture, A.S., but it denied review.66 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
and courts in other jurisdictions have also ruled on this issue. Following
is an examination of both the Texas cases and cases in other jurisdictions.
1. Common Law in Texas-Applying PCV to the LLC
While the TLLCA does not address piercing the veil of the LLC, sev-
eral Texas courts have. Recently, in McCarthy v. Wani Venture, A.S., the
Houston Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the TLLCA was an
absolute shelter to veil piercing allegations, concluding the same princi-
ples that apply to corporations applied to the LLC.67 This case is note-
worthy in piercing of the LLC veil in Texas and could have had
paramount significance if the Texas Supreme Court had granted petition
for review. Claiming fraud and attempting to pierce the corporate veil,
Wani Venture, A.S. ("Wani Venture"), successor in interest to Norgips
USA, Inc. ("Norgips"), filed a suit against several defendants, including
Marcie McCarthy. 68 Triple M Supply, LLC ("Triple M"), a wallboard dis-
62. Schwindt, supra note 53, at 1554 (quoting CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S.
KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: TAX AND BUSINESS LAW 6.03[2], at 6-28
(footnotes omitted)).
63. § 322B.303(2).
64. Schwindt, supra note 53, at 1554.
65. See id.
66. McCarthy v. Wani Venture, A.S., 251 S.W.3d 573 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2007, pet. denied).
67. Id. at 590-91.
68. Id. at 576. At trial, evidence regarding numerous intertwined companies (Caribe,
Caribe 1, JTM Supply, JTMM, K Cor, M Global, Triple M Operating, Triple M Supply, and
WoodPal Ltd.), with basically the same three owners (Marcie McCarthy, Anthony Mos-
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tributor, entered into an agreement with Norgips, a manufacturer and
seller of wallboard, to be Norgips's sole East Texas distributor.69
Marcie McCarthy, the appellant, was a one-third owner of Triple M, an
LLC, and was the only remaining defendant of the original case.70 Mc-
Carthy brought six issues on appeal,7 1 including the argument that the
trial court erred in holding that she was liable under the veil piercing
theory for Triple M's debt.7 2 Among her other issues on appeal were the
definition of "actual fraud" in the jury charge and the evidence support-
ing a finding of actual fraud and damages. 73 The court of appeals upheld
the jury instruction and found there was sufficient evidence to support
the findings of fraud and damages.7 4 Additionally, the court affirmed the
piercing of the LLC veil.7 5
The veil piercing issue in McCarthy warrants discussion and could have
a substantial impact on Texas common law in this area. Basing her argu-
ment on the absence of veil piercing from the TLLCA, McCarthy con-
tended that the veil of the LLC is "impenetrable," and therefore cannot
be pierced for corporate debt.76 The court rejected this argument. 77 Al-
though it acknowledged that the TLLCA does not address veil piercing,
the court noted that Texas courts, along with other jurisdictions, have
used state law corporate veil piercing theories to pierce the LLC veil.78
Further, the court stated that McCarthy had not only failed to present
any judicial backing for her argument that corporate veil piercing theo-
ries should not be applied to LLCs, but also that the court itself could not
find any judicial backing.7 9 Next, the court applied Article 2.21, the cor-
porate veil piercing law, to the facts of the case to find that the trial court
was not in error.80 It affirmed the jury's finding that McCarthy, for her
chella, and Michael Moschella), established a complicated interrelationship of business en-
tities. Id. at 78-79. Further evidence showed that their was extensive overlapping of these
entities, with money flowing from entity to entity as if it were one entity, related party
transactions, and self dealing. Id. at 582-83.
69. Id. at 576.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 589.
73. Id. at 576. The jury charge included two questions: "(1) did McCarthy cause Triple
M Supply to be used to perpetrate an actual fraud and did perpetrate an actual fraud upon
Norgips, primarily for her own direct benefit and (2) what sum of money would compen-
sate Norgips for the conduct found in answer one for unpaid Norgips wallboard invoices
and attorney's fees." Id. at 584.
74. Id. at 587-88.
75. Id. at 590.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 591.
78. Id. at 590-91 (citing Pinebrook Props., Ltd. v. Brookhaven Lake Prop. Owners'
Ass'n, 77 S.W.3d 487, 499 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. denied)); In re Secs. Inv. Prot.
Corp. v. R.D. Kushnir & Co., 274 B.R. 768, 775-76 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 2002); Hamilton v.
AAI Ventures, L.L.C., 768 So. 2d 298, 302 (La. App. 2000); Kaycee Land & Livestock v.
Flahive, 46 P.3d 323, 327 (Wyo. 2002).
79. Id. at 591.
80. Id. The court specifically applied the language of Article 2.21 to pierce the corpo-
rate veil "where there is a finding that the shareholder 'caused the corporation to be used
for the purpose of perpetrating and did perpetrate an actual fraud on the obligee primarily
2008] Comment 1671
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own benefit, perpetrated actual fraud through Triple M upon Norgips.81
In conclusion, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's holding that
McCarthy was liable for the LLC's debt.8 2
The dissent did not disagree with the majority's proposition that corpo-
rate veil piercing could be applied to the LLC.83 Instead, the dissent dis-
agreed with the majority's finding that there was sufficient evidence to
support the jury's finding that McCarthy caused the LLC to perpetrate
fraud for her direct personal benefit.84 Therefore, it appears both the
majority and dissent in McCarthy concluded the same veil piercing princi-
ples apply to Texas LLCs as apply to Texas corporations. A petition for
review by the Texas Supreme Court was filed, but the high court failed to
seize on the opportunity to address the LLC veil piercing doctrine.85
As cited and followed by the McCarthy court, other Texas courts have
applied corporate veil piercing to the LLC. In Pinebrook Properties, Ltd.
v. Brookhaven Lake Property Owners' Association, a Texas court of ap-
peals applied the alter ego theory of corporate veil piercing to the plain-
tiff's attempts to pierce the veil of Pinebrook Properties Management,
LLC and Pinebrook Properties, Ltd. (a limited partnership). 86 This case
was the result of a complex history of conflict in previous suits. 87 In such
previous cases, landowners and a property owner's association success-
fully sued Musgrave, president of an LLC which was the general partner
of a Texas limited partnership, for obligations under a restrictive cove-
nant by piercing the LLC veil on the theory of alter ego.88
On appeal, Musgrave brought eight issues, most notably that the trial
court erred in its conclusion that the LLC and other business entities
were the alter egos of Musgrave.8 9 The court stated that alter ego is a
theory for piercing the corporate veil.90 Further, citing Article 2.21(A)(3)
as authority, the court said the failure to follow formalities is not a factor
in determining whether the alter ego theory applies.91 However, the
court of appeals concluded the trial court erred in applying the corporate
for the direct personal benefit of the' shareholder." Id. at 591 n.12 (citing TEX. Bus. CORP.
Acr ANN. art. 2.21 (Vernon Supp. 2005)).
81. Id. at 591. The court based its affirmation on the evidence presented to the jury,
"that McCarthy and her two partners (1) used Triple M Supply as a front to borrow funds
and order wallboard on credit from Norgips... ; (2) diverted to themselves... proceeds
due to Triple M Supply through the use of complex and undocumented financial transac-
tions and the commingling of inventory and bank accounts; and (3) left Triple M Supply
undercapitalized and unable to pay its creditors." Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 592-95 (Jennings, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 592.
85. McCarthy v. Wani Venture, A.S., 251 S.W.3d 573 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2007, pet. denied).
86. Pinebrook Props., Ltd. v. Brookhaven Lake Prop. Owners' Ass'n, 77 S.W.3d 487
(Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. denied).
87. Id. at 490-93 (discussing the history of the previous cases, Musgrave I-II).
88. Id. at 493-94.
89. Id. at 491.
90. Id. at 499 (citing Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. 1986)).
91. Id. (citing TEX. Bus. CoRP,. ACr ANN. art. 2.21(A)(3) (Vernon 2003)).
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veil piercing theory to Pinebrook Properties, Ltd., because the limited
partnership, not the LLC general partner, owned the property with the
restrictive covenant that was in dispute.92 Veil piercing does not, and
need not, apply to limited partnerships because of the inherent liability of
the general partner for the obligations of the partnership. 93 Next, the
court reviewed whether the trial court had properly pierced the veil of
Pinebrook Properties Management, LLC, by finding it was the alter ego
of Musgrave. 94 The court recognized an LLC is unique from other Texas
business forms and that "'[e]xcept as and to the extent the regulations
specifically provide otherwise, a member or manager is not liable for the
debts, obligations or liabilities of a limited liability company including
under a judgment decree, or order of a court." 95 Then, the court applied
the alter ego theory of corporate veil piercing to the relationship between
Musgrave and the LLC.96 Evaluating the alter ego theory, the court also
applied Article 2.21(A)(3), which provides that failure to follow corpo-
rate formalities cannot be used to pierce the corporate veil.97 The court
concluded the plaintiffs did not establish sufficient evidence that the LLC
was an alter ego. 98 Further, the evidence they did bring only demon-
strated a lack of corporate formalities which, evaluated by the court
under Article 2.21(A)(3), was not adequate to create an alter ego.99 Also
noteworthy was the fact the plaintiffs attempted to argue that the busi-
ness entities were set up fraudulently. 100 Although actual fraud supports
a finding of corporate veil piercing under Article 2.21, the court noted the
plaintiffs had only pleaded the alter ego theory and not the fraud theory
and, therefore, that issue could not be raised.101 In conclusion, the court
of appeals reversed the trial court's finding that the limited partnership
and the LLC were alter egos of Musgrave. 10 2
Most recently, in the case of In re JNS Aviation, a Texas bankruptcy
court, relying on the McCarthy holding, pierced the veil of an LLC under
the theory the owner created a sham LLC to perpetrate a fraud. 10 3 The
plaintiff/creditor brought veil piercing claims under the single business
enterprise, sham to perpetrate a fraud, evasion of an existing legal obliga-
tion, and alter ego theories. 10 4
92. Id. at 499-500.
93. Id. at 499 (citing TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1, § 4.03(b) (Vernon Supp.
2008)).
94. Id. at 500.
95. Id. (quoting TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, art. 4.03(A) (Vernon Supp.
2008)).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 500-01.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 500-01.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 501.
102. Id.
103. In re JNS Aviation, LLC, 376 B.R. 500 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2007).
104. Id. at 520.
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The dispute originally began when the creditor sued the LLC in a Dela-
ware federal court on the basis of breach of contract by the LLC and two
individuals, when they refused to repurchase an airplane that the LLC
had previously sold.10 5 However, between the time the suit was filed and
the entry of default judgment, the LLC owners created another LLC in
New Mexico and transferred assets belonging to the original LLC to the
new LLC.10 6 The creditor filed a suit in a Texas federal district court to
enforce the default judgment, but the LLC declared bankruptcy.10 7
This brought the course of events to the trial in the bankruptcy court,
where fraud and veil piercing claims were asserted. l08 One of the main
issues before the court was whether veil piercing claims were applicable
to an LLC. 109 The court stated that the recent Texas appellate court
holding in McCarthy countered the defendant's argument that the Texas
LLC statute is a shield against veil piercing claims.110 Further, the court
noted the McCarthy court recognized the Texas statute does not speak to
the theory but that Texas courts and other jurisdictions have applied cor-
porate veil piercing statutory and case law to the LLC.11 Having estab-
lished that under the McCarthy holding corporate veil piercing principles
should be applied, the court went on to discuss the Texas corporate veil
piercing law. 112
After laying the roadmap for the theory and the supporting law, the
court then turned to the issues of whether the facts of the case at bar were
sufficient to establish any of the asserted veil piercing theories and
whether the defendants, for their direct personal benefit, perpetrated an
actual fraud on the plaintiff.1 ' 3 The court stated its task was to "sift the
facts through the outlined legal framework of veil piercing as limited by
section 21.223 of the TBOC."'1 4 The court performed a detailed analysis
of the various "strands" of the doctrine and applied the facts of the case
through those "strands. '115 Although the facts of the case satisfied a
number of alter ego and single business enterprise factors, they were not
precisely compatible with those doctrines.' 16 In addition, the court con-
cluded the "illegal purpose strand" of the doctrine was not the best fit for
the case either. 117
The court found the facts best aligned with the sham to perpetrate a
fraud strand.118 After considering the facts and the evidence, the court
105. Id. at 519.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 506.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 526.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 526-27.
113. Id. at 527.
114. Id.
115. See id. at 527-31.
116. Id. at 529-30.
117. Id. at 530.
118. Id.
concluded, under Texas law, the plaintiff had established a veil piercing
claim under that theory. 119 Next, the court found the plaintiffs suffered
injury as a consequence of actual fraud resulting from the numerous
transactions devised by the defendants and their companies for their own
personal benefit. 120 In conclusion, the court held that the LLC veil was
pierced under the sham to perpetrate a fraud theory. 12 1
In DDH Aviation, LLC v. Holly, the district court for the Northern
District of Texas applied corporate alter ego cases and Article 2.21(A) to
an LLC. 122 A multitude of parties and claims comprise the history of this
case.' 23 DDH Aviation, LLC (DDH), the plaintiff/counter-defendant,
was first "formed as a corporation but later altered its business form to
become a limited liability company."'1 24 The third-party defendant in this
case, Affiliated Computer Services, Inc. ("ACS"), was a corporation. l2 5
The issue in this case of particular interest to this discussion was whether
there was a foundation for the alter ego, the single business enterprise, or
both of these theories of liability. 126
First, the court addressed whether DDH and ACS operated as a single
business enterprise, applying the corporate veil piercing analysis to the
LLC and the corporation. 27 The court stated the applicable law was
whether: "(i) the two corporations share a common business purpose and
(ii) the corporations have integrated their resources to achieve that com-
mon business purpose.' 128 To establish the second element, integration
of resources, the court gave an eleven-factor test.129 Finding the entities
did not share a common business purpose, and further, that the plaintiffs
did not even allege this, the court held the single business enterprise the-
ory did not apply; therefore, the court did not have to analyze the inte-
grated resources test.' 30
Next, the court tackled the alter ego theory. 131 Applying Texas law to
DDH because it is a Texas LLC, the court said to hold DDH's sharehold-
ers liable for the LLC's actions, the third party plaintiffs must prove the
119. Id.
120. Id. at 531 (finding that the members, through the LLC, committed actual fraud by
transferring the LLC's assets and declaring bankruptcy in avoidance of creditor's default
judgment).
121. Id.
122. DDH Aviation, L.L.C. v. Holly, No. Civ. A. 3:03-CV-2598-P, 2005 WL 770595
(N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2005).
123. See id. at *1-3 for a background on the cast of characters, procedural history, and
third party complaints.
124. Id. at *1. The opinion is silent as to when the entity changed from a corporation to
an LLC and which incidents occurred while the entity was a corporation as opposed to an
LLC.
125. Id. at *2.
126. Id. at *3.
127. Id. at *6.
128. Id.
129. Id. at *3 n.9 (quoting Olympic Fin. Ltd. v. Consumer Credit Corp., 9 F. Supp. 2d
726, 728 (S.D. Tex. 1998)).
130. Id. at *6.
131. Id.
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alter ego theory and also that the shareholders perpetrated an actual
fraud under Article 2.21(A)(2). 132 The court held the evidence presented
was sufficient to find the necessary unity of the parties under the alter ego
theory and denied the motion to dismiss allegations that DDH was the
alter ego of third party defendant Deason. 133 However, the court did not
find the necessary establishment of evidence that DDH was the alter ego
of ACS. 134 In conclusion, the court applied Texas corporation case law
(alter ego and single business enterprise theories) and statutory law (Ar-
ticle 2.21(A) of the TBCA) to a Texas LLC. 135
2. Texas Courts Applying the Laws of Another Jurisdiction to PCV of
an LLC
A Texas bankruptcy court applied Delaware law to pierce the veil of a
Delaware LLC, Final Arrangements ("FAL"), in In re Kilroy.136 The
court identified the following three alternative theories for piercing the
veil of an LLC under Delaware law: "(1) using offensive collateral estop-
pel under Texas Law; (2) using offensive collateral estoppel under Dela-
ware law; or (3) using the alter ego doctrine."'1 37 Applying Texas and
Delaware law respectively, the court held that under both theories (1)
and (2), the debtor was collaterally estopped from denying the LLC was
his alter ego.' 38
Next, the court discussed the third theory, piercing the corporate veil
by using the alter ego doctrine under Delaware law.139 After discussing
Delaware case law regarding the alter ego theory, the court concluded
that based on the allegations and facts of the case, the plaintiffs had pled
adequate facts to support a finding. 140 Finally, the court spoke about the
application of the alter ego theory to a Delaware LLC.14' The debtor
argued that under the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act
("DLLCA"), members or managers are not liable for the obligations,
debts, and liabilities of the LLC.142 Acknowledging the absence of veil
piercing in the DLLCA and the shortage of Delaware case law on the
issue, the court determined that the Delaware Chancery Court had
"nonetheless conceptually endorsed LLC veil piercing when it made spe-
132. Id. at *7 n.l (citing Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. 1986);
TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.21(A)(2) (Vernon 2003)). The court applied Delaware
law to analyze whether ACS was the alter ego of third party defendant Deason because
ACS is a Delaware corporation. For the court's alter ego analysis of ACS under Delaware
law, see id. at *8-9).
133. Id. at *3.
134. Id. at *8.
135. Id. at *6-8.
136. In re Kilroy, 357 B.R. 411, 425 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006). The court also ruled on
several other issues that are beyond the breadth of this paper. Id.
137. Id. at 425.
138. Id. at 427-28.
139. Id. at 428-29.
140. Id. at 429.
141. Id. at 430.
142. Id. at 430 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-303(a) (2006)).
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cific references to corporate veil piercing in the context of LLCs."'143
3. Fifth Circuit Common Law-Applying PCV to the LLC
The Fifth Circuit, when applying Louisiana law, has treated the LLC in
the same manner as a corporation for veil piercing purposes.144 In Hollo-
well v. Orleans Regional Hospital LLC, the Fifth Circuit rejected chal-
lenges to the jury's finding of veil piercing of several entities, including an
LLC.145 One of the issues on appeal was whether the veil of an LLC was
pierced under the alter ego theory. 146 The court reviewed this issue
under Louisiana law, which is silent on piercing the veil of an LLC.147
The court noted the district court's holding that Louisiana would treat an
LLC like a corporation under the alter ego veil piercing theory.148 The
court stated that commentators agreed that LLCs would be treated like
corporations in regards to veil piercing. 14 9
4. A Texas Court-Respecting the LLC as a Distinct Entity
Although not explicitly rejecting application of the piercing doctrine to
LLCs, a Texas appellate court respected the LLC as a separate and dis-
tinct entity and refused to impose liability on the LLC members. 150 In
Ingalls v. Standard Gypsum LLC, an injured employee brought a negli-
gence claim against members of an LLC. 15' The trial court granted sum-
mary judgment based on the LLC members' arguments that they were
immune from the suit under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act be-
cause they were members of the LLC and as such were "employers" of
the employee under the Act.' 52 On appeal, the court considered the issue
of first impression as to whether members of an LLC could be considered
"employers" for purposes of the Texas Workers' Compensation Act. 53
The court discussed the limited liability shield that the TLLCA pro-
vides for its members under Article 4.03.154 The plaintiff relied heavily
on Sims v. Western Waste Industries1 55 in which the defendant attempted
143. Id. (citing Trs. of Arden v. Unity Constr. Co., No. C.A. 15025, 2000 WL 130627, at
*3-4 (Del. Ch. Jan. 26, 2000)).
144. Hollowell v. Orleans Reg'l Hosp. LLC, 217 F.3d 379, 385 (5th Cir. 2000).
145. Id. at 385, 388.
146. Id. at 379, 381.
147. Id. at 385.
148. Id. at 385 n.7 (noting that neither party disputed this holding of the district court).
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., Ingalls v. Standard Gypsum, L.L.C., 70 S.W.3d 252, 254-55 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 2001, pet. denied).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 254-55.
153. Id. at 258-61.
154. Id. at 260 (citing TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, § 4.03 (Vernon Supp.
2008)).
155. Sims v. W. Waste Indus., 918 S.W.2d 682, 686 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1996, writ
denied) ("We are not persuaded that the legislature ever intended parent corporations,
who deliberately chose to establish a subsidiary corporation, to be allowed to assert immu-
nity under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act by reverse piercing of the corporate veil
they themselves established.").
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to "reverse pierce" the corporate veil in order to assert workers' compen-
sation immunity as a defense to a tort suit by an employee. 156 The court
noted the LLC is separate and distinct from its members and provides its
members with a limited liability shield, in agreement with the Sims
court.' 57 The court acknowledged that the Sims opinion required an in-
dependent tort separate from the employment relationship. 158 In sum-
mary, the court respected the LLC as a distinct and separate entity from
its members by rejecting the proposition that the members were consid-
ered "employers" under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act. The
court reversed and remanded the portion of summary judgment that was
based solely on one member's membership as an LLC, but did not con-
sider whether the member had committed an independent tort.159
5. Case Law in Other Jurisdictions Whose LLC Statutes Are Silent to
Piercing
Many state LLC statutes are silent to veil piercing, as is the Texas stat-
ute. However, the courts of those states have been presented with, and
have addressed, the doctrine in the context of the LLC. Following, are a
few significant cases from other jurisdictions speaking to LLC veil
piercing.
In Ditty v. Checkrite, Ltd., a federal court in Utah applied corporate
veil piercing theory to an LLC even though the Utah statute is silent with
respect to LLC veil piercing.160 In that case, several individuals wrote
bad checks to various retailers who referred these checks to Checkrite, a
collection agency.' 61 There were numerous claims and cross claims under
the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act and Fair Credit Reporting Act,
between the plaintiffs and the defendants, the collection agency, its law
firm, and attorney. 62
The plaintiffs brought a claim for personal liability against the attorney
for his firm's collection activities under two theories, one being that the
firm was the alter ego of the attorney.163 The court analogized the liabil-
ity shield of corporate shareholders to that of LLC members, noting the
Utah LLC statute provides, "neither the members, the managers, nor the
employees of a limited liability company are personally liable under a
judgment, decree, or order of a court, or in any other manner, for a debt,
obligation, or liability of the limited liability company.' 64 However, the
court also stated Utah courts will pierce the corporate veil in limited situ-
156. Ingalls, 70 S.W.3d at 260. However, the Ingalls court distinguished the Sims case
because Sims, a corporate defendant, was sued under an independent tort (products liabil-
ity). Id. at 261.
157. Id. at 260.
158. Id. at 261.
159. Id.
160. Ditty v. Checkrite, Ltd., 973 F. Supp. 1320, 1324-36 (D. Utah 1997).
161. d. at 1324.
162. Id. at 1325-26.
163. Id. 1335.
164. Id. (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-109(1)).
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ations.a65 Despite the fact there is little case law regarding veil piercing
of entities other than corporations, the court acknowledged that the the-
ory applies to LLCs, as most commentators agree. 166 The court went on
to apply the corporate veil piercing doctrine to the LLC. 167 After dis-
cussing the corporate veil piercing law, specifically the alter ego theory,
the court concluded the plaintiffs did not present sufficient evidence to
support a finding that the veil of the LLC should be pierced. 168 Although
the LLC entity was not disregarded, the court applied the same principles
to the LLC as it would to a corporation.169
The Wyoming Supreme Court, notably the first state to pass a statute
creating the LLC, held that LLC veil piercing was an equitable remedy
available under the Wyoming LLC Act, despite the statute's silence, in
Kaycee Land & Livestock v. Flahive.a70 This case arose from a land-
owner's allegations that an LLC caused environmental damage to land
that it was using under a contract. 171 The issue before the court was: "In
the absence of fraud, is a claim to pierce the Limited Liability entity veil
or disregard the [LLC] entity in the same manner as a court would pierce
a corporate veil or disregard a corporate shield, an available remedy
against a Wyoming [LLC] under Wyoming's [LLC] Act. 1 72 First, the
court discussed the evolution of the doctrine in regard to Wyoming's cor-
porate context.' 73 Examining the history of the doctrine, the court noted
the concept is also absent from the Wyoming corporate statutes and is
solely a remedy of equity founded in common law.174
Next, the court reviewed the legislative history of the Wyoming LLC
statute and concluded there was no evidence the legislature intended to
preclude the veil piercing doctrine from being applied to the LLC.1 75
Finding no reason to treat LLCs differently from corporations, the court
concluded the members should not be shielded from liability if they do
not regard the LLC as a distinct and separate entity.176 In support of
their conclusion, the court noted that the majority of commentators have
165. Id. (citing Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)).
166. Id. at 1335-36.
167. Id. at 1336.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1335-36.
170. Kaycee Land and Livestock v. Flahive, 46 P.3d 323, 326, 329 (Wyo. 2002).
171. Id. at 324.
172. Id. at 324; (citing Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-15-101 to -144 (2001)).
173. Id. at 325-26.
174. Id at 326.
175. Id. at 326-28. Among other evidence of legislative intent, the court also noted one
reason that the Wyoming statute does not specifically address veil piercing, while other
state statutes do was the fact that Wyoming was the very first to enact a statute and did not
have the advantage of years of history in which these issues arose. Id. at 326-27. Addition-
ally, the court stated that "[ilt is not to be presumed that the legislature intended to abro-
gate or modify a rule of the common law by the enactment of a statute upon the same
subject; it is rather to be presumed that no change in the common law was intended unless
the language employed clearly indicates such an intention . I..." Id. (quoting McKinney v.
McKinney, 135 P.2d 940, 942 (Wyo. 1943)).
176. Id. at 327.
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also concluded the doctrine should apply to the LLC. 177 Additionally,
most courts, when presented with a case in which the facts indicate the
LLC veil should be pierced but the statute is silent, have applied common
law. 178
The court, however, stated the factors considered when piercing the
corporate veil would not be identical in an LLC case.179 The reason for
this difference is the flexibility of the LLC in regard to organizational
formalities.180 Acknowledging it would not be feasible to set forth all of
the factors that should be considered in future LLC cases, the court
pointed to various commentators for appropriate factors concerning LLC
veil piercing.181
Finally, the court addressed the language of "in the absence of
fraud." 182 This language suggests the veil may be pierced in a fraud case
notwithstanding a statute silent to specific instances in which the courts
may act.' 83 Rejecting the assumption that fraud is necessary, the court
stated "'[f]raud is, of course, a matter of concern in suits to disregard
corporate fictions, but it is not a prerequisite to such a result.'" 84 Fur-
ther, they held the same reasoning should be applied in the LLC con-
text.1 85 Turning the question into a fact determination for the jury, the
court concluded "'[e]ach case involving the disregard of the separate en-
tity doctrine must be governed by the special facts of that case."
1 86
Therefore, the case was remanded to the district court to conduct a "fact
intensive inquiry and exercise its equitable powers" in determining
whether the veil should be pierced considering the specific facts of the
case.
187
In D.R. Horton Inc.-New Jersey v. Dynastar Development, L.L.C., a
New Jersey court, applying an LLC statute that is silent as to veil pierc-
ing, discussed the theory in detail and concluded the corporate doctrine
should not be "mechanically applied" to the LLC.' 88 In its analysis of
veil piercing for LLCs, the court first conducted a statutory analysis.
189
The court concluded the legislature supported evolution of common law
in this area, but the legislature did not intend for courts to "mechanically
apply" the corporate veil piercing doctrine to the LLC.190
177. Id. at 328 (citing various articles by expert LLC commentators).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. (quoting Amfac Mech. Supply Co. v. Federer, 645 P.2d 73, 79 (Wyo. 1982)).
185. Id.
186. Id. (quoting Opal Mercantile v. Tamblyn, 616 P.2d 776, 778 (Wyo. 1980)).
187. Id. at 328.
188. D.R. Horton Inc.-N.J. v. Dynastar Dev., L.L.C., No. MER-L-1808-00, 2005 WL
1939778, *31-36 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Aug. 10, 2005) (holding that the LLC veil was
not pierced).
189. Id. at *31-32.
190. Id. at *33.
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Next, the court looked to commentators and decisional law in other
jurisdictions for guidance. 191 Relying heavily on the Wyoming Supreme
Court decision in Kaycee, the court found support for its conclusion that
factors in LLC cases should not mirror those in corporate cases.' 92 As
further support for this proposition, the court cited numerous commenta-
tors who agreed with the principle that the doctrine should be modified
to deal with the unique attributes of the LLC. 193 Adherence to formali-
ties, reliance on dominance and control of the LLC (including alter ego
factors), and undercapitalization were all included in the factors that
should be weighed differently in LLC cases.194 Finally, the court applied
a "modified" New Jersey corporate veil piercing test to the facts of the
case and found the plaintiff failed to prove both prongs of the test.195
Predominantly, the plaintiff failed to prove the LLC was an alter ego or
mere instrumentality of the defendant, when considering adherence to
formalities and dominance and control factors with less weight than a
normal corporate case. 196 Therefore, the court held that the plaintiff did
not set forth a foundation for piercing the LLC's veil. 197
III. ANALYSIS OF PIERCING THE VEIL OF A TEXAS LLC
With a background of the LLC entity and Texas corporate veil piercing
doctrine, along with a discussion of the statutory and case law of Texas
and other jurisdictions, this comment now turns to analysis of the LLC
doctrine in Texas. It will first consider how Texas should develop the law
in regard to piercing the LLC veil. Then it will contemplate whether the
LLC or corporate form offers greater protection against veil piercing in
Texas.
A. WHERE SHOULD TEXAS LLC PIERCINc LAW Go FROM HERE?
Absent any statutory authority from the legislature or any mandatory
common law from the Texas Supreme Court, attorneys, courts, and busi-
ness persons alike are somewhat in the dark on the strength of the LLC's
liability shield. While the TLLCA speaks in very general terms regarding
the limited liability of members, it provides no guidance as to whether
that liability shield can be pierced.t 98 In stark contrast, the legislature has
provided specific guidance on piercing the veil of a corporation. 199 The
legislature, however, did not immediately speak to the doctrine in the
191. Id. at *33-37.
192. See id. at *34-36.
193. See id. at *34.
194. Id. at *35-36.
195. Id. at *36-38. The two prong test required the plaintiff to prove "(1) [the] L.L.C.
was a mere instrumentality or alter ego of [defendant]; and (2) [defendant] abused the
business form to perpetrate a fraud, injustice, or otherwise circumvent the law." Id. at *36.
196. Id. at *36.
197. Id. at *38.
198. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, § 4.03A, C (Vernon Supp. 2008); see also
TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.114 (Vernon 2008).
199. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.21 (Vernon 2003).
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corporate statutes. Cases addressing corporate veil piercing theories
were present in Texas more than fifty years before the legislature ac-
ted.2°° Further, the legislature arguably acted only out of dire necessity,
in response to the Castleberry decision which had rewritten the doctrine
so broadly it appeared any jury would be able to arbitrarily disregard the
corporate entity.20 1 Therefore, if the legislature holds out as long as it did
on the corporate veil piercing statute, it may be decades before it ad-
dresses the LLC doctrine by statute. Further, if the legislature follows its
pattern from corporation law and the Texas Supreme Court never makes
a ruling that writes LLC piercing doctrine as broadly as it did with corpo-
rations in Castleberry, then the legislature may never speak statutorily to
LLC piercing. The legislature may leave it up to the courts to develop
common law in the LLC area.
It is interesting that in the corporate veil piercing arena, Texas was the
very first state to codify the doctrine, 20 2 but Texas is not taking the same
lead in regard to the LLC. This comment suggests the Texas legislature
should enact a statute addressing LLC veil piercing. Just as it has clari-
fied and defined the law for corporations, the legislature should do the
same for LLCs. The vagueness of the doctrine, coupled with its haphaz-
ard application by the courts, makes the LLC veil piercing doctrine an
area that would greatly benefit from statutory guidance. 20 3 Courts would
benefit from more structured guidance as they did from Article 2.21 in
the corporate setting. Judges would not have to speculate whether they
should strictly apply corporation common law and Article 2.21, whether
they should apply a "modified LLC version" of corporation law, or
whether they should disregard corporation law altogether. Further, a
statute could provide specific guidance as to different types of claims,
such as with contract and tort, as does Article 2.21.204 A statute tailored
to the unique attributes of the LLC would be extremely beneficial. Obvi-
ously, the LLC and the corporation have distinct, meaningful differ-
ences-the reason behind creating the LLC business form. Courts have
recognized that the differentiating aspects of the LLC necessitate addi-
tional considerations when contemplating veil piercing. 20 5 In addition,
statutes in other jurisdictions have recognized the unique aspects of the
LLC and have tailor-written their statutes as such.206 Texas should follow
this lead. The California statute would be an excellent statute for Texas
200. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank in Canyon v. Gamble, 132 S.W.2d 100, 103 (Tex. 1939);
Pac. Am. Gas Co. v. Miller, 76 S.W.2d 833, 851 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1934, writ
ref'd).
201. Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. 1986).
202. HAMILTON & MACEY, supra note 6, at 279.
203. See id., supra note 6, at 261 for a discussion of the vagueness of the doctrine and its
application by the courts.
204. See TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.21(A)(2) (Vernon 2003).
205. See e.g., Kaycee Land and Livestock v. Flahive, 46 P.3d 323, 329 (Wyo. 2002); D.R.
Horton Inc.-N.U. v. Dynustar Dev., L.L.C., No. MER-L-1808-BO, 2005 WL 1939778, at
*31-36 (N.J. Aug. 10, 2005).
206. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 17101(b) (West 2008).
[Vol. 611682
Comment
to model because of its precise language and tailored application of the
doctrine to the LLC.20 7 In drafting a statute, the legislature should ad-
dress the doctrine as applied to differing causes of action, as Texas' Arti-
cle 2.21 and California's LLC statute do. Further, a functional statute
would speak specifically to the attributes of the LLC, such as informali-
ties, dominance and control, and undercapitalization, as statutes such as
California's and cases such as D.R. Horton Inc.-New Jersey point out.20 8
If the legislature does not enact a statute specifically addressing LLC
piercing, then business persons and attorneys will continue to speculate as
to how the courts will develop the common law.
Recently, in McCarthy, a Texas appellate court was presented with the
issue and concluded the same principles of corporate veil piercing should
apply to LLCs.209 The court did not solely apply the corporate common
law but also looked to statutory corporate law. 210 The court specifically
applied the corporate fraud standard in Article 2.21 to the LLC and
found the member perpetrated fraud for her personal benefit. 211 Addi-
tionally, the court relied upon other courts, both in Texas and other juris-
dictions, which have applied the theory to the LLC.212 For example, the
McCarthy court relied upon another Texas appellate court's finding of
LLC veil piercing in Pinebrook.213 The Pinebrook court also applied Ar-
ticle 2.21 of the corporation statute. 214 Although the court in Pinebrook
found the veil was not pierced, the application of the corporate doctrine
to the LLC was consistent with the McCarthy application.
The McCarthy court also relied on the Supreme Court of Wyoming's
holding in Kaycee that LLC veil piercing was an equitable remedy even
though the statute was silent as to the theory.2 15 The Kaycee court's anal-
ysis can be slightly distinguished from the Texas courts' pattern of analy-
sis because it did not make any distinction between tort and contract
cases as to the actual fraud requirement. In contrast, the Texas courts
appear to be following Texas corporate veil piercing law, which requires
actual fraud in contract cases. The Article 2.21 actual fraud requirement
is helpful and should continue to be applied to the LLC as it tends to
weed out arbitrary veil piercing in contract cases. The Kaycee court rec-
ognized the corporate veil piercing doctrine should not be applied in a
"cookie cutter" fashion to the LLC due to unique differences between
the two entities.216 The court did not formulate a definite list of addi-
207. See id.
208. See id.; D.R. Horton Inc., 2005 WL 1939778, at *31-36.
209. McCarthy v. Wani Venture, A.S., 251 S.W.3d 573, 589-91 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 591.
212. See id. at 590-91.
213. See id. at 590-91.
214. See Pinebrook Props., Ltd. v. Brookhaven Lake Prop. Owners' Ass'n, 77 S.W.3d
487, 499-501 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. denied).
215. See McCarthy, 251 S.W.3d at 590-91.
216. Kaycee Land & Livestock v. Flahive, 46 P.3d 323 (Wyo. 2002).
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tional considerations, most likely due to the novelty of the theory in re-
gards to the LLC and the lack of extensive common law in the area.
However, for support, the court directed attention to several commenta-
tors who had spoken on the subject of applying the doctrine to the
LLC.217 The commentators' works would be helpful in applying the doc-
trine in Texas as well.
Further, there appears to be unanimous support for application of both
corporate common law and statutory law by the McCarthy court since the
dissent did not disagree with the majority's proposition that the corporate
doctrine could be applied to the LLC.2 18 The point on which the dissent
disagreed with the majority was whether there was sufficient evidence of
perpetration of a fraud for direct personal benefit.219 In other words, the
dissent believed the majority had used the correct "test," but disagreed
with the application of the specific facts and evidence. This case, there-
fore, represents unanimous support for LLC veil piercing. Unfortu-
nately, the Texas Supreme Court denied review and at present has left
Texas courts without any mandatory authority. Even though the court
chose not to review the case, McCarthy will still likely have an impact on
the common law. In fact, a Texas bankruptcy court relied on McCarthy
only a few months after the opinion was issued. 220 The JNS Aviation
court relied upon McCarthy to pierce the veil of an LLC under the theory
the LLC was created to perpetrate a fraud.221 The JNS Aviation court,
just as the court in McCarthy, recognized that although the Texas LLC
statute was silent regarding piercing the LLC veil, courts in Texas, and
other jurisdictions have applied both corporate common law and statu-
tory law.222 Additionally, as in McCarthy, the court applied Article 2.21
of the corporate statute and pierced the veil under the fraud doctrine.
22 3
DDH Aviation is further substantiation that Texas courts are likely to
apply corporate law to the LLC in the future. 224 A federal court in the
Northern District of Texas analyzed both the corporate alter ego and sin-
gle business enterprise doctrines in applying corporate case law and Arti-
cle 2.21.225 Precedent is clearly being established by Texas courts.
Another example is a Texas bankruptcy court which pierced the veil of a
Delaware LLC in In re Kilroy.226 Although the court applied Delaware
law, it is nevertheless a useful case because Delaware, like Texas, does
not address veil piercing in its LLC statute. The Texas bankruptcy court
acknowledged the statutory absence on the issue, but determined the
217. Id. at 327-28.
218. See McCarthy, 251 S.W.3d at 590-94.
219. Id. at 593-94.
220. See In re JNS Aviation, LLC, 376 B.R. 500 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2007).
221. Id. at 530-31.
222. Id.
223. See id. at 531.
224. See generally DDH Aviation, L.L.C. v. Holly, No. Civ. A. 3:02-CV-2598-P, 2005
WL 770595 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2005).
225. Id.
226. See In re Kilroy, 357 B.R. 411, 430 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006).
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Delaware Chancery Court had endorsed the concept.2 27 As the Texas
courts continue down this path, codification from the legislature or en-
dorsement and clarification from the Texas Supreme Court would be a
valuable roadmap for the future to courts, attorneys, and business per-
sons alike.
There does not appear to be a case in Texas which has explicitly re-
jected the concept of piercing the veil of the LLC. Although some courts
have chosen not to pierce the veil, they have still acknowledged the doc-
trine, but held that the facts of the specific case were not sufficient to
apply it.228 Refusing to impose liability on members, a Texas appellate
court in Ingalls respected the LLC as a separate and distinct entity.22 9
The Ingalls court agreed with another Texas appellate court which had
refused to pierce the corporate veil in Sims v. W. Waste Industries.230
However, the Sims case regarded a corporation and the issue of reverse
piercing. The similarity between Ingalls and Sims was both involved
Texas Workers' Compensation Act claims.231 Therefore, the court in In-
galls reliance on Sims was in respect to the intent of the Workers' Com-
pensation Act, rather than whether an LLC's veil can be pierced.232
Further, although the Ingalls court stated an LLC was separate and dis-
tinct from its members, it did not explicitly reject the possibility of LLC
veil piercing. 233 The case was, in essence, about other issues and was re-
manded to consider whether the member had committed an independent
tort, which would not even require veil piercing to hold the member lia-
ble.234 Besides the fact the LLC veil piercing doctrine was not the under-
lying issue, there is another probable reason the court did not explicitly
speak about LLC piercing. The case was tried in 2001, and there was
little development in Texas case law applying the doctrine to the LLC at
the time. The other major Texas cases discussed in this comment all oc-
curred after the Ingalls case. In conclusion, although the Ingalls court
refused to impose liability on the LLC members, the court did not reject
the doctrine as applied to the LLC. Therefore, based on the brief history
of the doctrine with respect to the LLC, it is suspected courts will con-
tinue to apply the doctrine to the LLC.
Case law from other jurisdictions would also be useful to the Texas
courts as they develop the Texas common law. In fact, Texas courts have
already looked outside of their jurisdiction for guidance. As previously
227. See id.
228. See Pinebrook Props., Ltd. v. Brookhaven Lake Prop. Owners Ass'n, 77 S.W.3d
487, 500-501 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. denied) (applying corporate veil piercing
theory and concluding that the evidence was not sufficient to support a finding that the veil
was pierced).
229. Ingalls v. Standard Gypsum, L.L.C., 70 S.W.3d 252, 260 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2001, pet. denied).
230. See id. at 260; see also Sims v. W. Waste Indus., 918 S.W.2d 682, 686 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont 1996, writ denied).
231. See Ingalls, 70 S.W.3d at 254-55; Sims, 918 S.W.2d at 683.
232. See Ingalls, 70 S.W.3d at 259-61.
233. See id. at 261.
234. See id.
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discussed, the McCarthy court relied on the Wyoming Supreme Court's
opinion in Kaycee.2 35 Cases such as Kaycee, in which the state law ap-
plied does not have an LLC statute speaking to veil piercing, are of par-
ticular value to Texas courts and practitioners who do not have a veil
piercing section of their statute to reference. In Ditty, a Utah court ap-
plied the corporate veil piercing doctrine to the LLC despite the LLC
statute's silence on the doctrine. 236 Notably, Ditty stated the same princi-
ples would apply to the LLC as apply to the corporation.237 Ditty is one
of the earlier cases applying the theory to the LLC. In Hollowell, the
Fifth Circuit, applying Louisiana law which is silent to the theory, stated
Louisiana would treat an LLC like a corporation with respect to the alter
ego theory.2 3
8
Finally, a New Jersey court in D.R. Horton used a "modified" corpo-
rate veil piercing test to determine whether an LLC could be disregarded
under New Jersey law, which is also silent as to the issue. 239 Just as the
McCarthy court had done, the court relied heavily on Kaycee.240 How-
ever, in contrast to McCarthy, the court centered its attention on Kaycee's
conclusion that the factors in the corporate cases should not be "mechani-
cally" applied to LLCs.241 This is a point the Texas courts should focus
on as they develop this area of common law due to the fact the two busi-
ness forms are different, and those distinctions should be considered
when attempting to pierce the veil. Although Kaycee did not create a list
of specific factors, the court looked to many commentators for gui-
dance.24 2 The D.R. Horton court also pointed to numerous commenta-
ries in support of its opinion the doctrine should be tailored to the unique
attributes of the LLC.24 3 Further, the D.R. Horton court provided a
more detailed framework which would be helpful to Texas courts.244 The
court recognized factors including adherence to formalities, reliance on
dominance and control of the LLC (including alter ego factors), and un-
dercapitalization among those that would be given different weight in re-
spect to the LLC versus the corporation.2 45 In conclusion, case law from
other jurisdictions, especially those jurisdictions in which the LLC statute
does not address veil piercing, is a valuable resource for the Texas courts.
235. See McCarthy v. Wani Venture, A.S., 251 S.W.3d 573,590-91 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).
236. See Ditty v. Checkrite, Ltd., 973 F. Supp. 1320, 1335-36 (D. Utah 1997) (finding
that plaintiffs had not produced evidence sufficient to permit piercing of the LCC veil).
237. See id. at 1335-36.
238. See Hollowell v. Oleans Reg'l Hosp., 217 F.3d 379, 385 (5th Cir. 2000).
239. See D.R. Horton Inc.-N.J. v. Dynstar Dev., L.L.C., No. MER-L-1808-00, 2005 WL
1939778, at *31-36 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Aug. 10, 2005).
240. See McCarthy, 251 S.W.3d at 590-91.
241. See D.R. Horton, Inc., 2005 WL 1939778, at *35.
242. See Kaycee Land and Livestock v. Flahive, 46 P.3d 323, 328 (Wyo. 2002).
243. See D.R. Horton Inc., 2005 WL 1939778, at *34.
244. See id. at *35-36.
245. See id.
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B. Is THE LLC THE BEST CHOICE IN TEXAS?
The second point of discussion presented by the development of the
doctrine with respect to the LLC is whether the LLC or the corporate
form offers greater protection against veil piercing in Texas. Considering
the fact the TLLCA does not address veil piercing, one may be subject to
pre-Article 2.21 law in Texas when using the LLC form. Although the
courts thus far have applied corporate common law and Article 2.21 in
LLC cases, there is no statutory or common law authority from the Texas
Supreme Court mandating application of the corporate statute to the
LLC. While a corporation has the mandatory protection of Article 2.21,
the LLC may not have this protection. Therefore, when considering the
possibility of member liability with respect to liability of an LLC, it might
be a safer choice to use the corporate form over the LLC.
The corporate and LLC business forms have distinct characteristics
from one another. As noted, this has been recognized by courts in their
application of the corporate veil piercing doctrine to the LLC. 246 One of
the major distinctions is the flexibility of the LLC management structure,
as it can be managed by members, managers, or both.24 7 This provides
for greater flexibility than the more rigid officers and directors structure
of a corporation. Additionally, the Texas statute grants authority to all
officers and managers of an LLC to act on behalf of the company for its
business purpose. 248 In contrast, the powers of a director of a corpora-
tion, who must normally act in agreement with the majority vote, are
much narrower and more rigid. Consequently, dominance and control
are factors that should not necessarily be weighed equally when attempt-
ing to pierce the LLC veilas opposed to the corporate veil. Further, an
LLC is designed for more informal operations. It does not have to follow
the corporate formalities of records and documentation, such as minutes
and resolutions. Clearly, disregard of the LLC entity should not be iden-
tical in all situations to that of a corporation. If a certain formality is not
required by the LLC statute, then not following that formality cannot
equate to disregarding the entity. Therefore, in certain instances it should
be more difficult to pierce the LLC veil than the corporate veil.
Notably, the Texas corporate statute offers a considerable amount of
shelter against veil piercing. Article 2.21(A)(2) provides an extra "layer"
of protection to corporations by limiting instances in which juries may
arbitrarily pierce the veil. 249 In contract cases, the corporate veil may
only be pierced if there is sufficient evidence the shareholder, for his di-
rect personal benefit, used the corporation to perpetrate an actual
fraud.250 Further, according to Article 2.21(A)(3), the failure to follow
246. See, e.g., Kaycee, 46 P.3d, at 327-28; D.R. Horton Inc., 2005 WL 1939778, at *31-36.
247. See TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.251 (Vernon 2008).
248. See id. § 101.254.
249. See TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.21(A)(2) (Vernon 2003).
250. See id.
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corporate formalities is not considered a factor in veil piercing.251
With no provisions in the Texas LLC statute speaking about the veil
piercing doctrine, and no Texas Supreme Court authority on the issue,
courts may be able to arbitrarily disregard the LLC entity. At least if a
business chooses the corporate form, it would have some assurance
against veil piercing in situations such as contract cases or cases based
solely on the lack of corporate formalities. However, an LLC does not
have those protections of Article 2.21. The fact that Texas courts have
applied Article 2.21 to LLCs is merely an application in specific cases. It
does not necessarily mean the courts will always apply Article 2.21 to an
LLC. Indeed, they have no obligation to apply it since Article 2.21 is not
the statute that the entity was formed under. Without a ruling from the
Texas Supreme Court stating courts must apply Article 2.21 to LLCs, it is
solely an argument that could be made, but not clearly defined law.
Therefore, an LLC veil might be pierced in a contract case on the basis of
constructive fraud. Also, the inherent nature of an LLC is less formal
than that of a corporation, and it would be more susceptible to a veil
piercing theory based on disregard for formalities. While a Texas corpo-
ration has this protection under the statute, the LLC does not. Al-
though a Texas LLC could be susceptible to piercing under that theory,
the courts should look to other jurisdictions for guidance and recognize
the distinctions between corporations and LLCs.252 In summary, under
the current state of the law in Texas, a court may be able to arbitrarily
pierce the LLC veil. Thus, one might have a stronger, or more certain,
liability shield as a corporation with the protection of Article 2.21.
IV. CONCLUSION
Texas courts appear to be heading down the path of developing the
common law of the veil piercing doctrine as applied to the LLC. While
codification from the legislature would be ideal, at a minimum, endorse-
ment and clarification from the Texas Supreme Court would be desirable
for the courts, attorneys, and business persons. Although the Texas Su-
preme Court did not grant review of McCarthy, optimistically, it will have
another opportunity to address the issue in the near future. As has been
discussed, although there is still much fine tuning of the doctrine to come,
case law from Texas and other jurisdictions, as well as commentaries on
the issue, can be of great assistance to the courts, legislature, attorneys,
and business persons. In the meantime, absent authority from the legisla-
ture or the Texas Supreme Court, it is worth contemplating whether the
LLC or the corporate form offers greater protection against veil piercing
in Texas.
251. Id. art. 2.21(A)(3).
252. See Kaycee Land and Livestock v. Flahive, 46 P.3d 323, 327-28 (Wyo. 2002); D.R.
Horton Inc.-N.J. v. Dynstar Dev., L.L.C., No. MER-L-1808-00, 2005 WL 1939778, at *35-
36 (N.J. Super. Law Div. Aug. 10, 2005).
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